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Abstract 
 The affect heuristic and implicit attitudes are two separate concepts that have 
arisen within different literatures but that have a number of similarities.  This paper 
compares these two constructs with the aim of clarifying exactly what they are and 
how these relate to one another.  By comparing and contrasting the affect heuristic 
and implicit attitudes we conclude that the ‘affect pool’ of images tagged with 
feelings referred to within the affect heuristic literature may be equivalent to the 
construct of implicit attitudes.  Further to this, the affect heuristic itself could be 
considered as a specific sub-type of spontaneous process that is driven by implicit 
attitudes.  We propose that each of the implicit attitude and affect heuristic constructs 
could be further developed through the examination and comparison of existing 
literatures surrounding the other.  Implications for future research are outlined. 
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Introduction 
The affect heuristic and implicit attitudes are two very interesting concepts 
that have developed within the areas of risk and of attitudes respectively.  Implicit 
attitudes refer to the spontaneous associations that can be measured between attitude 
objects and their evaluations.  The affect heuristic refers to the process of using 
underlying feelings that are associated with a particular hazard in forming perceptions 
of risks and benefits.  These two concepts have emerged within different literatures 
and have been of undeniable benefit within each.  However, there are a variety of 
similarities between these concepts both conceptually, and procedurally in the way 
that they are measured, which indicates that these concepts may refer to the same or 
similar phenomenon.  This review is not intended to diminish either of these concepts 
but is rather aimed at stimulating research which may provide advances in either or 
both of these by conducting an analysis and comparison of the two in order to direct 
future research.   
The Affect Heuristic 
The affect heuristic is described as being an emotion-based shortcut used 
within decision-making (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).  It is 
proposed that images (which may be perceptual or symbolic representations) within 
the mind are tagged to varying degrees with positive and negative affective feelings 
and that these are used to guide judgements and decision-making, particularly when 
decision-making is carried out spontaneously or with limited cognitive resources.  It is 
argued that this method of decision-making is a more efficient way of making 
decisions when time or mental resources are limited (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004).  Our evolutionary ancestors are thought to have relied on this type 
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of decision-making, using intuition and instinct to make decisions, before analytical 
decision-making tools were developed.      
The important role of emotion in decision-making has been recognised by a 
variety of researchers.  For example, Zajonc (1980) put forward the idea that affective 
reactions to stimuli are our very first reactions and guide subsequent perceptions and 
information processing.  Emotion has also been included as a crucial factor in 
decision-making within Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis, Epstein’s 
(1994) dual process theory of rational and experiential thinking and Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee and Welch’s (2001) risk as feelings hypothesis, amongst other theories. 
 The theoretical development of the affect heuristic stems primarily from 
evidence obtained within risk research that indicated that feelings of dread were the 
main determinant of public perceptions and acceptance of risk for a variety of 
different hazards (Fischoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978).  It was noted 
that, although in reality risk and benefit tend to be positively correlated, people’s 
individual perceptions of risk and benefit tend to be negatively correlated (Fischoff et 
al., 1978).  In addition to this, the inverse relationship noted between perceived risks 
and benefits was related to the strength of positive or negative affect associated with 
the particular hazard in question (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994).  In other words, it seems 
that perceptions of risks and benefits are driven by feelings.  If feelings are positive 
this leads an individual to judge risks as low and benefits as high and if feelings are 
negative this leads an individual to judge risks as high and benefits as low.  In further 
support of this view, Finucane et al., (2000) demonstrated that perceptions of benefits 
could be influenced by manipulating risks and vice versa.  So, for example, increasing 
perceived benefits resulted in a decrease in perceived risks.  The affect heuristic is 
also found to be relied on to a greater extent when decision time is limited.  Evidence 
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indicates that the inverse relationship noted between risks and benefits is more 
pronounced when judgements are made under a time-pressured condition (Finucane et 
al., 2000). 
The affect heuristic is described as using an ‘affect pool’ which contains 
images (perceptual and symbolic representations) of objects and events which are 
linked to varying degrees with positive and negative affective markers (Slovic, Peters, 
Finucane and MacGregor, 2005).  The description of an ‘affect pool’ has much in 
common with the experiential (or spontaneous) system of processes which is 
described within dual process attitude models  (e.g. Epstein, 1994; Chaiken, 1980; 
Fazio, 1990; Devine, 1989) and contrasted with a rational system of processes.  The 
experiential system is theorised to depict reality using images, metaphors and 
narratives which are differentially associated with affect and which processes 
information rapidly.  In contrast, rational systems are thought to be a logical system 
which encodes reality using symbols, words, and numbers and which processes 
information more slowly (Epstein, 1994).  
Implicit Attitudes 
 Implicit attitudes have been defined as ‘introspectively unidentified (or 
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favourable or 
unfavourable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects’ (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995, p. 8).  In other words, these are evaluative associations that have been 
developed through previous experience that are held (possibly without conscious 
knowledge) towards attitude objects.  See Fazio and Olson (2003) or Spence (2005) 
for a more extensive review of implicit attitudes.  In contrast to explicit attitudes, 
which are generally measured using direct questions, implicit attitudes are examined 
indirectly using measures such as reaction time tasks or by examining non-verbal 
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behaviour.  Within measures of implicit attitudes, people are asked to respond (or 
observed whilst responding) spontaneously to relevant stimuli in order that the 
individual’s basic associations with those stimuli can be examined. 
 The construct of implicit attitudes is, as yet, controversial and the way in 
which implicit attitudes relate to explicit attitudes remains a point for discussion.  One 
view, the dual attitude model (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) postulates that 
implicit and explicit attitudes are separate constructs that are developed in different 
ways.  This model suggests that an individual can hold more than one attitude towards 
the same attitude object and that which attitude is activated will depend on the 
situation and the cognitive resources available to the individual. 
The alternative view, held by the majority of researchers, asserts that implicit 
and explicit attitudes are measures of different underlying systems of processes 
through which attitudes are produced.  In this way, implicit and explicit attitudes can 
actually be thought of as two different measures of attitudes rather than as entirely 
different constructs1.  This is the view held by dual process theorists (e.g. Epstein, 
1994; Chaiken, 1980; Fazio, 1990; Devine, 1989) who, as previously discussed, 
outline a system of experiential processes and a system of rational processes.  Implicit 
attitudes are thought to measure processes within the experiential system and explicit 
attitudes to measure processes within the rational system.   
More recently, the conceptual relationship between the postulated experiential 
system and the rational system of processes (and the corresponding measures of 
implicit and explicit attitudes) has been elaborated on.  Strack and Deutsch (2004) 
proposed the Reflective-Impulsive model which developed the ideas of the 
experiential (here described as impulsive) and the rational (here described as 
reflective) system of processes and integrated these concepts with motivational 
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components in order to produce a more complete explanation of how these processes 
may influence behaviour.  Within this model, associations activated within the 
experiential system of processes are postulated to be subordinate to, and form the 
basis for, the rational system of processes which may build on, discard, or otherwise 
qualify these associations as appropriate (see also Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006 
and Green, Applebaum and Tong, 2006).  In this way, implicit attitudes are 
conceptualised as a measure of initial associations that are activated by an attitude 
object, these associations are simple and exist independently of truth values.  For 
example, an individual may hold negative associations with African Americans due to 
a knowledge of negative stereotypes even though that individual may not agree with 
the association and may regard this as false.  Measurements of explicit attitude are a 
measure of these same associations once these have been modified by processes 
within the rational system, e.g. self presentation effects or contextual information (see 
Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek and Schmitt, 2005, for a review of moderators of the 
implicit – explicit attitude relationship).  Hence, an individual may suppress the 
negative associations that he/she may have with African American individuals 
because it is understood that it is wrong to stereotype people by race in this way.   
Comparison of the affect heuristic and implicit attitudes 
 The affect heuristic and implicit attitudes appear to have a number of 
similarities with regards to the way that they are defined and with regards to the way 
that they are measured.  Both have (1) been linked with affect, (2) are described as 
being spontaneous in nature, and (3) have been linked to the experiential system of 
processes within dual process theories.  Each of these observations will now be 
discussed.     
 
 8 
1. Affect 
Affect is referred to within theoretical descriptions of implicit attitudes and of 
the affect heuristic.  Within the affect heuristic, affect is defined as ‘the specific 
quality of goodness or badness (a) experienced as a feeling state (with or without 
consciousness) and (b) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus’ 
(Slovic et al., 2005, p.35).  This is quite a general description of affect which seems to 
encompass the definition of an attitude.  There have been a variety of definitions of 
the term attitude.  For example Thurstone (1931, p 261) states that, “Attitude is the 
affect for or against a psychological object”, Krech, Cruthfield and Ballachy (1962, p. 
139) report that “Attitudes [are] enduring systems of positive or negative evaluations, 
emotional feelings, and pro or con action tendencies with respect to social objects” 
and Greenwald and Banaji (1995, p. 7) suggest that, “Attitudes are favourable or 
unfavourable dispositions toward social objects, such as people, places, and policies”.  
Most of these definitions seem to relate to the definition provided for affect as used 
within the affect heuristic literature, either encompassing (b) as stated above or both 
(a) and (b).  It is possible therefore that affect, as referred to within the affect 
heuristic, fundamentally refers to an attitude – a simple evaluation of the “goodness” 
or “badness” of something. 
 Implicit attitudes have also been repeatedly associated with affect (Epstein 
1994; Marsh, Johnson, & Scott-Sheldon, 2001).  Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) 
recently suggested that implicit attitudes may correspond to the affective component 
of attitude outlined within the tripartite model of attitudes that distinguishes affective, 
cognitive and behavioural components of attitude (Zanna and Rempel, 1988) and that 
explicit attitudes may be a joint product of affective and cognitive components.  The 
distinction between implicit attitudes as affective and of explicit attitudes as cognitive 
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(or as a joint product of cognition and affect) is intuitively appealing.  However, there 
are as yet few empirical examinations of the relationship between implicit attitudes 
and affect. 
An important study often cited as evidence for a relationship between implicit 
attitudes and affect examined implicit racial attitudes and neural activation.  This 
study demonstrated that implicit attitudes towards Black people covaried with 
amygdala activation in White people exposed to photos of Black people (Phelps, 
O’Connor, Cunningham, Funayam, Gatenby, Gore et al., 2000).  As the amygdala is 
associated with emotional learning, it was thought that implicit attitudes may be 
linked to emotional experiences in particular.  However, the amygdala has also been 
linked with evaluative decision-making situations that may not elicit conscious 
emotions which indicates that the role of the amygdala may be more generally 
evaluative rather than being linked to specific emotional experiences (Bechera, 
Damasio, Tranel and Damasio, 1997).  Another possible reason for this finding may 
be that the specific attitude under observation (racial attitudes) may have an emotional 
basis; it does not necessarily mean that all implicit attitudes have an emotional basis.   
 Further evidence has indicated that the affective component of an attitude was 
accessed faster than the cognitive component of the attitude (Verplanken, Hofstee and 
Janssen, 1998).  This may help to explain links between affect and implicit attitudes 
because implicit attitudes are typically assessed at very fast speeds.  However, Giner 
Sorolla (2004) investigated this finding in more depth and demonstrated that in 
stimuli used within their study, the affective component of an attitude was only 
accessed faster than cognitive components when the attitude object had an affective 
basis, e.g. desserts. 
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  Some more recent investigations have indicated that implicit attitudes towards 
the self can predict affective state (Conner and Barrett, 2005; Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
Interestingly, findings indicate that only negative affective states are influenced by 
implicit self attitudes and positive affective states remain unaffected.  Results imply 
(and are interpreted as) that implicit self attitudes may have a role in the defence of 
threats to self appraisal.  However, the specificity and interpretation of these findings 
indicate that any relationship between implicit attitudes and affect may be limited to 
attitudes towards the self rather than implicit attitudes more generally. 
Overall, there is a variety of evidence that indicates a link between implicit 
attitudes and affect.  Empirical evidence remains sparse however, and results are 
complicated, underlining the likely complexities that exist within the relationship.  
Again though, this is highly dependent on the definition of affect.  If affect has a 
broad definition that includes any association with evaluations, then an attitude by its 
very nature is strongly associated with affect (but no more so with implicit attitudes 
than with explicit attitudes).  However, if affect is defined as an emotional experience 
then current evidence is not conclusive.  It seems that although both the affect 
heuristic and implicit attitudes have repeatedly been linked with affect, empirical 
support for specific associations between these constructs and well defined measures 
of affect are lacking, and this is an interesting direction for future research. 
2. Spontaneity 
The affect heuristic and implicit attitudes have also both been associated with 
spontaneity.  Both are commonly measured under time-pressured conditions in order 
to examine spontaneous, rather than deliberate, associations.  It is noted however that 
(generally) no time limit is utilised and some deliberation may be possible during 
longer time lengths (D. Green, personal communication, November 30, 2006), this is 
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an issue for both the affect heuristic and implicit attitudes.  Within the affect heuristic 
literature, evidence suggests that the influence of the affect heuristic (on judgements 
of risk and benefit) becomes stronger under time pressured conditions (Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic and Johnson, 2000).  Further evidence indicates more generally that 
the influence of affective responses to stimuli on behaviour increases under time 
pressured conditions (Shiv, and Fedorikhin, 2002).  In a similar way, implicit attitudes 
are found to be better predictors of spontaneous rather than deliberate behaviour 
(Asendorpf, Banse and Mucke, 2002; Steffens and Konig, 2006; Spence and 
Townsend, in press).  It is possible that further refinement of the measurement of 
these constructs may enable purer measurements of spontaneous processes. 
3. Experiential System of Processes 
Both the affect heuristic and implicit attitudes have been linked theoretically 
with an experiential system of processes, described within dual process theories of 
attitudes.  One possible distinction that could be drawn between implicit attitudes and 
the affect heuristic relates to what each construct actually refers to conceptually 
within the experiential system of processes (we thank an anonymous reviewer for 
raising this point).  Tasks that examine implicit attitudes measure associations 
between a target stimulus and positive and negative evaluations, whereas tasks that 
examine the affect heuristic measure perceptions of risk and benefit relating to a 
target stimulus that are presumed to be driven by underlying affective evaluations.  
For this reason, implicit attitudes are most commonly defined as a measure of the 
content of the experiential system of processes whereas the term affect heuristic is 
commonly used to refer to the active use of the content of the experiential system of 
processes during decision making.  This is an important and interesting distinction 
that deserves further exploration both empirically and conceptually.  It is possible that 
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implicit attitudes are simply a different description of the ‘affect pool’ described 
within the affect heuristic literature that consists of images linked with positive or 
negative markers.  The affect heuristic may therefore constitute the act of using 
implicit attitudes (within the field of risk) and could be conceptualised as a sub-type 
of spontaneous process that is driven by implicit attitudes.  Indeed, to the extent that 
speeded risk and benefit judgments can themselves be regarded as a spontaneous 
behaviour, implicit attitudes may be found to be a good predictor of these judgements.  
In fact, to the extent that the bounds of the affect heuristic are unknown, it is possible 
that the affect heuristic may predict evaluations or behaviours other than risk and 
benefit judgements in a similar way to implicit attitudes, particularly under time 
restricted conditions.  Therefore, it is possible that the affect heuristic and implicit 
attitudes may be referring to different aspects of a similar phenomenon.   
Implications for Future Research 
The comparison of the affect heuristic and implicit attitude constructs would 
benefit from an empirical assessment of the affect heuristic using measures of implicit 
attitude.  It would be interesting to see if an implicit attitude held towards a stimulus 
predicts perceived risks and perceived benefits of that stimulus.  In this way, the 
proposition that implicit attitudes are equivalent to the ‘affect pool’ described within 
the affect heuristic literature could be examined.  Further to this, it would be useful to 
examine whether an implicit attitude task adapted in order to measure associations 
between an object and risk-benefit evaluations (e.g. Siegrist, Keller and Cousin, 2006) 
would provide the same results as a task used in order to measure the affect heuristic.   
 As noted earlier, whilst both constructs under scrutiny here have been linked 
to affect, the association with affect is likely to depend on the specific definition of 
affect itself.  Further research should, therefore, examine the relationship between 
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affect and the affect heuristic and implicit attitudes whilst being careful to define 
exactly what is meant by the term ‘affect’.  One way of doing this might be to attempt 
to actually develop implicit attitudes in an experiment using different techniques.  The 
most common method of inducing implicit attitudes is through evaluative 
conditioning (see De Houwer, Thomas, and Baeyens, 2001, for a review).  In relation 
to this, it would be useful to compare implicit attitudes that are developed using 
associations with other valent stimuli (as the unconditioned stimulus) with implicit 
attitudes that are developed using associations with feelings or emotional states.  
Similarly, it would be interesting to examine how measurements of the affect heuristic 
differ depending on whether associations held towards target attitude objects are 
induced using different techniques.  It is noted that the affect heuristic literature is 
relatively sparse with regard to the way in which this construct is developed and it 
may be particularly beneficial to draw on literature regarding implicit attitudes in this 
respect.    
Further known characteristics of these constructs and evidence that has been 
gathered in association with one construct may help to inform the other.  For example, 
it is found that implicit attitudes are to a certain extent uncontrollable or, at least, 
difficult to control (Kim, 2003; Steffens, 2004).  It would be interesting to examine 
the degree of control associated with the affect heuristic.  This could be done in 
several ways, the spontaneity of the task could be varied by utilising a response 
window or increasing cognitive load.  Alternatively, the participant could be provided 
with different aims in completing the task, for example they could be asked to present 
themselves in a certain way, e.g. as a risk averse or risk seeking individual, when 
completing the task. 
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A wealth of different avenues for exploring implicit attitudes and the affect 
heuristic in association with each other exist and this paper was written in order to 
open the debate and stimulate research in this area.  The conceptual and empirical 
comparison and clarification of implicit attitudes, and the affect heuristic will benefit 
both constructs and will help to refine theory and understanding within the domains of 
risk and attitude research. 
Conclusions 
 The affect heuristic and implicit attitudes are defined very similarly.  Both 
constructs are associated with affect, both are measured in a spontaneous manner, and 
both are linked with the evaluative system of processes described within dual process 
theories of attitudes.  It is noted, however, that these constructs refer to somewhat 
different phenomena; implicit attitudes refer to the actual evaluative associations that 
people hold towards attitude objects whilst the affect heuristic refers to the application 
of evaluative associations in risky decision-making.  We conclude that implicit 
attitudes may equate to the ‘affect pool’ of images associated with positive and 
negative markers referred to within the affect heuristic literature.  In turn, the affect 
heuristic could be conceptualised as a specific type of implicit process that is driven 
by implicit attitudes, though these assertions require empirical verification.  These 
claims are not intended to diminish the importance of either construct which both 
have demonstrable utility.  It is intended that the comparison of these constructs 
should instead stimulate further research in both domains and potentially across these 
two domains which may help to clarify and develop the conceptual understanding of 
the affect heuristic and implicit attitudes.   
 15 
 
References 
 
Alhakami, A. S., & Slovic, P. (1994). A Psychological-Study of the Inverse 
Relationship between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit. Risk Analysis, 14, 
1085-1096. 
Asendorpf, J. B., Banse, R., and Mucke, D. (2002).  Double dissociation between 
implicit and explicit personality self-concept: The case of shy behaviour.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.  83, 380-393. 
Bechera, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, B., Damasio, A. R. (1997).  Deciding 
Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy.  Science.  275, 
1293-1295. 
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic Versus Systematic Information-Processing and the Use 
of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 39, 752-766. 
Conner, T. and Barrett, L. F. (2005).  Implicit self-attitudes predict spontaneous affect 
in daily life.  Emotion, 5, 476-488. 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. 
New York: Avon. 
De Houwer, J., Thomas, S. and Baeyens, F. (2001).  Associative learning of likes and 
dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning.  
Psychological Bulletin, 127, 853-869.   
Devine, P. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 33-
40. 
 16 
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004).  I like myself but I don’t know why: Enhancing implicit self-
esteem by subliminal evaluative conditioning.  Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 86, 345-355. 
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious. 
American Psychologist, 49, 709-724. 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple Processes by Which Attitudes Guide Behavior - the 
Mode Model as an Integrative Framework. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 23, 75-109. 
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: 
Their meaning and use. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297-327. 
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect 
heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 13, 1-17. 
Fischoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How Safe Is 
Safe Enough - Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks 
and Benefits. Policy Sciences, 9, 127-152. 
Gawronski, B. and Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006).  Associative and propositional 
processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude 
change.  Psychological Bulletin.  132, 692-731.   
Giner-Sorolla, R. (2004). Is affective material in attitudes more accessible than 
cognitive material? The moderating role of attitude basis. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 34, 761-780. 
Green, D. W., Applebaum, R. and Tong, S. (2006).  Mental simulation and argument.  
Thinking and reasoning, 12, 31-61.   
 17 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit Social Cognition - Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27. 
Hofmann, W., Gschwendner, T., Nosek, B. A. and Schmitt, M. (2005).  What 
moderates explicit-implicit consistency?  European Review of Social 
Psychology. 16, 335-390. 
Kim, D.-Y. (2003). Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 66, 83-96. 
Krech, D., Crutchfield, R. S. and Ballachey, E. L. (1962).  Individual in society.  New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, E. S. (2001). Risk as 
feelings. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267-286. 
Marsh, K. L., Johnson, B. T., & Scott-Sheldon, L. A. J. (2001). Heart versus reason in 
condom use: Implicit versus explicit attitudinal predictors of sexual behavior. 
Zeitschrift Fur Experimentelle Psychologie, 48, 161-175. 
Phelps, E. A., O’Connor, K. J., Cunningham, W. A., Funayam, E. S., Gatenby, J. C., 
Gore, J. C., and Banaji, M. R. (2000).  Performance on indirect measures of 
race evaluation predicts amygdala activation.  Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience.  12, 729-738.   
Shiv, B. and Fedorikhin, A. (2002).  Spontaneous versus controlled influences of 
stimulus-based affect on choice behaviour.  Organisational Behaviour and 
Human Decision Processes, 87, 342-370. 
Siegrist, M., Keller, C., and Cousin, M. (2006).  Implicit attitudes towards nuclear 
power and mobile phone base stations: Support for the affect heuristic.  Risk 
Analysis.  26, 1021-1029. 
 18 
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk as analysis 
and risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality. 
Risk Analysis, 24, 311-322. 
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005). Affect, risk, and 
decision making. Health Psychology, 24(4), S35-S40. 
Spence, A. (2005). Using implicit tasks in attitude research: A review and a guide. 
Social Psychological Review, 7, 2-17. 
Spence, A. and Townsend, E. (in press).  Predicting behaviour towards genetically 
modified food using implicit and explicit attitudes.  British Journal of Social 
Psychology.   
Steffens, M. C. (2004). Is the implicit association test immune to faking? 
Experimental Psychology, 51, 165-179. 
Steffens, M. C. and Konig, S. S. (2006).  Predicting spontaneous big five behaviour 
with implicit association tests.  European Journal of Psychological 
Assessment, 22, 13-20. 
Strack, F. and Deutsch, R. (2004).  Reflective and impulsive determinants of social 
behaviour.  Personality and Social Psychology Review.  8, 220-247. 
Thurstone, L. L. (1931).  The measurement of attitudes.  Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology.  26, 249-269. 
Verplanken, B., Hofstee, G. and Janssen, H. J. W. (1998).  Accessibility of affective 
versus cognitive components of attitudes.  European Journal of Social 
Psychology.  28, 23-35. 
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. 
Psychological Review, 107, 101-126. 
 19 
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and Thinking - Preferences Need No Inferences. 
American Psychologist, 35, 151-175. 
 20 
Acknowledgements 
 Many thanks to Professor Paul Slovic, David Green, and several anonymous 
reviewers for their comments.  This research was funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the 
Economic and Social Research Council, and the Natural Environment Research 
Council.    
 21 
Footnote 
 
1 Within this manuscript, the terms ‘implicit attitude’ and ‘explicit attitude’ will be 
used, however this should not be taken as an adherence to a particular theoretical 
stance. 
